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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID BRAEGGER, JOHN R. LAR-
KIN, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8835 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We will adopt the same nomenclature as did the ap-
pellant in its brief and we are in agreement with the state-
ment of facts as therein set out as a general proposition. 
In support of our argument as to specific points, we will 
refer specifically to parts of the record and we will add a 
few additional references in support of that argument. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY COMPE-
TENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AS TO SEVER-
ANCE DAMAGES WERE ADEQUATE AND 
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED SUSTAINS THE 
JURY'S AWARD OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM 
CONSIDERATION BY THE JURY CLAIMED 
BENEFITS TO THE LANDS NOT TAKEN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY COMPE-
TENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
We can neither follow nor agree with the appellant's 
analysis of the manner in which the witness, Capener, 
arrived at his figures as to value. No witness for either 
party placed any value on the water rights owned by re· 
spondents and it was stipulated that the jury would no1 
consider water and that none was being condemned (R. 34) 
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However, appellant now seeks to place a value upon it based 
upon some theory that its value is reflected in what the 
respondents paid for a part of it a good many years ago. 
This is an objectionable and improper assumption. 
It is a basic concept of the law of eminent domain that 
the landowner whose land is being condemned, is entitled 
to the value of that land for its highest and best use. Moyle 
v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882; State v. 
Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630. The highest and best 
use of respondents' land was for the production of crops 
and the use of water for irrigating those crops was an 
indispensable part of that production. 
If the appellant had sought to condemn both the land 
and the water, respondents would have been entitled to an 
additional amol)nt of damage for the water. It is clear and 
beyond any reasonable doubt that all of the appraisers were 
viewing the respondents' lands as irrigated crop producing 
lands and that their values did not include any separate 
figure for the water rights. And the instructions of the 
Court fully covered this phase of the case as did the Court's 
remarks at the beginning of the trial. 
The case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District 
v. Skeen, decided by this Court on August 4, 1958, and not 
yet reported, holds : 
"The jury had the benefit of opinions from 
three qualified experts as to the value of the· land. 
Although these opinions varied considerably it is 
within the prerogative of the jury to believe whom 
it chooses, and it chose to believe defendants' expert 
rather than plaintiff's. On cross examination of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
two experts, called by plaintiff, some doubt was cast 
on the thoroughness of their inspection of the land, 
and this may well have affected the jury's consider-
ation of their lower evaluations." 
Each statement in the foregoing quotation is equally ap-
plicable to the present case. 
In addition, and as commented on by the trial judge 
at page 287 of the Record, there was competent evidence 
that the respondents were losing valuable hunting rights 
and privileges by the taking of their properties. Although 
no witness expressed an opinion as to the monetary value 
of these rights, there was uncontradicted evidence that they 
were valuable. 15 Am. Jur. on Damages, Sec. 356 at page 
795, states the rule: 
"Where the law presumes that the plaintiff 
suffered substantial damage from the alleged wrong-
ful act, it is not necessary for him to prove damages 
in any specific or certain amount in order to recover 
damages for a substantial amount." 
POINT II. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AS TO SEVER-
ANCE DAMAGES WERE ADEQUATE AND 
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED SUSTAINS THE 
JURY'S AWARD OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE. 
On page 13 of appellant's brief, there is a quotation 
from Stnte v. Coopera-tive Secu.rity Corp., 122 Utah 134, 247 
P. 2d 269. We adopt that quotation and feel that it cor-
rectly states the law that severance damage cannot be 
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awarded unless there is evidence that no comparable land 
is available to replace that taken by the condemnor. 
We would call this Court's attention to page 35 of the 
Record. The respondent offered evidence that would have 
shown that there was no comparable land available. The 
trial court, upon appellant's objection, refused to receive 
such evidence. We do not believe that appellant can now 
urge that it was error for the trial court to have sustained 
his objection. It was not, therefore, error to refuse to give 
the instruction that appellant requested. 
As to the state land lease, it is clear from the record 
that the witness, Capener, included $1,000.00 severance 
damages not for the "taking away of the State lease", but 
because the condemnation proceeding effectively made that 
said lease ineffective as any part of the new farm unit 
that would be left for operation by respondents. It was, 
without any doubt, a proper item of severance damage. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM 
CONSIDERATION BY THE JURY CLAIMED 
BENEFITS TO THE LANDS NOT TAKEN. 
We urge upon this Court that the trial judge acted 
properly in this respect for three sound reasons. First, 
there were no pleadings and no issue raised as to alleged 
benefits. Second, proper objection was made and there was 
no foundation laid for the evidence of value of the benefits 
as testified to by the witness. And third, the benefits testi-
fied to were general and not special. 
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As to the first reason above mentioned, we believe it 
to be self-evident and in need of no further comment. 
As to the second, we would call specific attention to 
the objection made and the ruling of the trial court as 
shown at page 279 of the Record. The witness, Warnick, 
was a civil engineer with twenty years experience with 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation. There is not a 
scintilla of evidence that he had had any experience in val-
uation and appraising or that he had ever done so before. 
He did not qualify as an expert and no foundation was 
laid for his evidence and it would have been error to have 
permitted a jury to speculate with this type of evidence. 
The third reason is, of course, the most important. We 
believe the best distinction between general and special 
benefits to be contained in 43 Iowa Law Review at page 
305, where it is stated: 
"Special benefits are defined as those that ac-
crue directly to the particular tract in question be-
cause of its peculiar relation to the public improve-
ment. General benefits are termed as those that 
accrue to lands generally in the vicinity because of 
the improvement." 
We invite the Court's attention to this article in the 
Io\va Law Review and to the cases there cited and also to 
the annotation in 145 A. L. R. commencing at page 7, with 
particular emphasis as to the language on page 49 where 
special benefits are defined as those peculiar to the property 
in litigation. 
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In the case of Salt Lake & Utah R. R. Co. v. Butterfield, 
46 Utah 431, 150 Pac. 931, the trial court charged the jury 
as follows: 
"In determining the question as to whether any 
benefits have accrued to _the remaining portion of 
the land by reason of the construction and opera-
tion of the railroad on the land taken, you should not 
take into consideration any benefits shared by the 
defendants as owners of this land with the commun-
ity in general, but only such benefits as are special 
to this particular property." 
The Court then proceeds : 
"In a much later case, namely, in Beveridge v. 
Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pac. 1040, 70 Pac. 1083, 59 
L. R. A. 581, 92 Am. St. Rep. 188, the rule adopted 
by this court is the one that is enforced in the latter 
case. In that case the court, in referring to the ques-
tion now under consideration, says: 
" 'General benefits consist in an increase in the 
value of land common to the community generally, 
from advantages which will accrue to the community 
from the improvement. Lewis on Eminent Domain, 
§ 471. They are conjectural and incapable of estima-
tion. They may never be realized, and in such case 
the property owner has not been compensated save 
by the sanguine promise of the promoter.' 
"The court then defines special as contradistin-
guished from general benefits and says that general 
benefits, as a rule, are based upon what the court 
calls the chance of increase in value by increased 
population and by increased facilities of transporta-
tion, etc. The court then proceeds : 
" 'This chance for gain is the property of the 
landowner. If a part of his property is taken for the 
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construction of the railway, he stands in reference 
to the other property not taken like similar property 
owners in the neighborhood. His neighbors are not 
required to surrender this prospective enhancement 
of value in order to secure the increased facilities 
which the railroad will afford. If he is compelled 
to contribute all that he could possibly gain by the 
improvement, while others in all respects similarly 
affected by it are not required to do so, he does not 
receive the equal protection of the law.' " 
In the case of Shurtleff v. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21, 
82 P. 2d 561, the fourth syllabus reads as follows: 
"In determining damage sustained by water 
right owner on city's appropriation of water rights 
for culinary purposes, substitution of culinary water 
with other waters could not be considered on theory 
of benefits to water right owner's land." 
Even if the evidence that was offered by the appellant 
as to the value of the benefits had been proper, such evi-
dence was directed to general benefits and not to special 
benefits. The trial court properly excluded the same from 
consideration by the jury. 
A recent Louisiana case, East Baton Rouge Parish 
Cou11cil v. Koller, 94 So. 2d 505, is directly in point and the 
following quotation from it shows not only the similarity 
in fact but the applicable rule of la'v: 
"Plaintiff parish council finally urges that the 
award should be reduced by disallowing any dam-
ages to the property not taken, since even defendant 
landowner's witnesses agree that the project will 
cause defendant's lot to increase in value because 
of the better drainage afforded it and the lesser 
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danger of flooding. That is, it is urged that the 
damages to the remaining land should be offset by 
the benefits accruing from the drainage project. 
"But the testimony is uncontradicted that such 
benefits as will accrue will also accrue to all other 
property in the area, whether or not abutting the im-
provement. These are general benefits to all prop-
erty concerned, not special to Koller's property. 
" 'General benefits [resulting from construction 
of the work] are those which are shared alike by all 
property owners in the neighborhood or community. 
Such damage as a property owner may sustain as a 
result of the construction and use of a public work 
cannot be offset by these general benefits. The rea-
son is that the citizen whose property is taken can-
not be compelled to bear more of the cost of the 
public improvement and general benefits resulting 
therefrom than is borne by other property owners 
whose property is neither taken nor damaged for 
the public purpose,' Louisiana Highway Commission 
v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654 at page 660; Oleck, 
Damages to Persons and Property, Section 225; 29 
C. J. S., Verbo Eminent Domain, § 183b, p. 1064." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment entered thereon is fully supported by 
competent evidence, that no error was committed by the 
trial court, and that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. MASON, 
JOSEPH C. FOLEY, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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